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1Community Ownership in Glasgow: the devolution of ownership and control, or 
a centralising process? 
The largest housing stock transfer in Europe, the 2003 Glasgow transfer promises to 
‘empower’ tenants by devolving ownership and control from the state to local 
communities.  This is to be delivered through a devolved structure in which day to 
day housing management is delegated to a citywide network of 60 Local Housing 
Organisations, governed at the neighbourhood level by committees of local residents.  
The receiving landlord, the Glasgow Housing Association, has further made 
commitments to disaggregate the organisation via Second Stage Transfer in order to 
facilitate local community ownership, as well as management of the housing stock.
This paper argues that whilst the Glasgow transfer has enhanced local control 
in the decision making process within the limits permitted by the transfer framework, 
it has nonetheless failed to deliver the levels of involvement aspired to by those 
actively engaged in the process.  Displaying at times more of the semblance of a 
movement than an organisation, the Glasgow Housing Association operates a classic 
centre-periphery divide. These tense central-local relations have contributed to the 
emergence of conflict which has further undermined negotiations surrounding the 
realisation of full community ownership via Second Stage Transfer. 
1. Introduction 
Prior to the stock transfer1, Glasgow City Council was a large municipal landlord 
(circa 85, 000 properties) with council housing comprising a key aspect of its political 
power base.  Yet it had to operate in a very difficult financial and political 
environment.  Given the package of incentives including £900 million pounds of debt 
write-off and £4 billion pounds of investment if stock transfer was to proceed it is 
2perhaps unsurprising the City Council positively endorsed the proposals (Gibb 2003; 
Daly et al 2005).  Following a tenant ballot the transfer was transacted in 2003, 
establishing the Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) as the UK’s largest social 
landlord.
Explicit in the pre-transfer framework and statutory consultation documents 
was a commitment to local control and ownership of the housing (Glasgow City 
Council 2001, 2002; Glasgow Housing Partnership Steering Group 2000).  This was 
to be achieved at the outset by the creation of a citywide network of 60 Local Housing 
Organisation (LHOs), each governed by a management committee made up of a 
majority of local tenants which would be responsible for management of the stock on 
a day-to-day basis.  These LHOs are small-scale, locally based, tenant-controlled 
organisations (for further discussion, see McKee 2006).  
In addition to devolved management of the local housing stock, a pre-transfer 
commitment was also made to local ownership via a process of Second Stage Transfer 
(SST).  SST is a concept unique to the Glasgow transfer and involves the LHOs 
embarking on further smaller stock transfers in order they might break away from the 
GHA and independently own the local housing (Glasgow City Council 2001, 
Glasgow Housing Partnership Steering Group 2000).  Whilst the GHA is committed 
to balloting tenants on SST within the first ten years from the original transfer 
(Glasgow Housing Partnership Steering Group 2000), and has endeavoured to 
accelerate the process via a programme of prototype funding pilots (GHA 2004), 
progress has been both slow and difficult and no Second Stage Transfers have as yet 
occurred (McKee 2006). 
An emotive and politically controversial issue within Glasgow and beyond, 
community ownership remains a relatively under-researched policy area.  This paper 
3aims to provide some insight into the present interim stage of transfer (i.e. post 
transfer from the City Council but prior to any SST), by exploring how housing
governance has changed in the city.  This involves comparing pre-transfer tenant 
involvement in the decision making process with the present situation, in particular 
the extent to which tenants have autonomy to make decisions on local housing matters 
and the perceived limits upon their local control. Secondly, given the express 
commitment to local ownership of the housing this paper also explores the perceived 
importance attached to SST and the conflict and tensions that surround the realisation 
of this coveted prize.  Empirical evidence from this study is presented in sections 5 
and 6.  To contextualise this evidence there is firstly a discussion of the relevant 
governance literature, followed by an exploration of the policy context of community 
ownership.
2. Governance, Power and Active Citizenship 
Governance has become a “shorthand” label to describe a particular set of changes in 
the way in which society is being governed (Newman 2001: 11).  Whilst it is an 
ambiguous concept which is defined and applied differently across a range of 
academic disciplines in general terms it represents both a change in the meaning of 
government and the emergence of new methods by which society is to be governed 
(Rhodes 1996; Kooiman 1999).
The emergence of this socio-political field therefore represents an attempt to 
capture this dynamic of change: it reflects the transcendence of hierarchy and markets 
by other forms of public-private mix (Rhodes 1994); the inter-dependence of state and 
non-state actors (Kooiman 1993); and the devolution of autonomy and responsibility 
from government to local communities (Rose 2001).  These transformations have 
4been driven by broader patterns of economic and social change, which has made the 
task of governing society along traditional lines more difficult – the outcome of which 
is that the state is no longer perceived as having the expertise or the ability to solve all 
of society’s problems (Rose 1999; Newman 2001).  
Uniting these disparate strands within the governance literature is a critique of 
the classical concepts of political sociology, particularly the dichotomous divisions 
between the state and the market, the public and private and so forth (Rose 1999).  
Despite these insights, the literature remains somewhat descriptive and normative: it 
focuses on describing the way organisations are, or should be, governed; and 
implicitly if not explicitly, portrays networks, partnerships and self-government as 
more desirable than both hierarchies and markets (Rose 1999; Newman 2001).  
Perhaps more fundamentally issues of power and agency have also been neglected, 
and are largely absent from debates (Newman 2001).  The exception to this has been 
the field of governmentality derived from Foucault, for it places power relations 
firmly at the centre of analysis by drawing attention to the way in which we think 
about power and rule in modern society (Foucault 2003a; see also Dean 1999).
Unlike traditional conceptions of power (see for example, Dahl 1961; 
Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Lukes 1974), governmentality proposes an investigation 
of political power beyond the state; indeed, Foucault’s definition of government as the 
“conduct of conduct” (2003b: 138) highlights that power is endemic in all social 
relationships: it is both diffuse and local, and it is to be located in the multiple micro-
practices of rule that authorities deploy in order to shape and direct the action of 
others towards desired ends.  Governmentality therefore lends itself to a wide variety 
of research agendas, which attempt to illuminate the problematic of government and 
the plethora of political rationalities and practical programmes that have emerged as a 
5result.  In addition, unlike traditional interpretations which conceive power as a 
negative, repressive act, a Foucauldian analysis emphasises its productive nature 
(Foucault 2003b).  Power does not attempt to exclude or control individuals, but puts 
people into action by a plethora of mechanisms which work through their political 
subjectivities, not always against them; here authorities try to enlist, maximise, and 
facilitate individual voluntary engagement in the political process in order the 
objectives of the ‘governed’ and the ‘governors’ may be reconciled (Cruikshank 
1994; 1999).  This is not however necessarily a reduction in government but rather a 
form of regulated freedom: governance from a distance (Rose 1999).  
Whilst governmentality highlights how modern liberal governance exercises a 
productive form of power which aims to promote active, responsible citizenship it 
also encourages us to be critical of democratic mechanisms such as user involvement, 
citizen empowerment and participatory democracy and so forth.  No matter how well 
intentioned these programmes may be they nonetheless represent a means of shaping 
the behaviour of citizens whose problems are deemed as needing to be addressed, and 
thus have the potential to be regulating as well as liberating (Cruikshank 1994; 1999).  
This mode of analysis therefore mounts a challenge to the traditional understanding of 
‘empowerment’ as a radical political project or a process to maximise citizen control.  
The implications of this are two-fold: firstly, that a potential disjuncture exists 
between how practices of empowerment are portrayed by their champions and the 
logic of such practices as embodied in strategies of government; and secondly, that 
promoting the agency of marginalised groups may not necessary lead to the 
realisation of a political utopia of free social relations, for relations of empowerment 
are not outside relations of power but located firmly within them (Dean 1999).
63. Community Ownership: the past and present policy context 
Since 1999 Scotland has had a devolved national government with the Scottish 
Parliament acquiring legislative control over most domestic policy issues, including 
housing; fiscal and economic matters remain the preserve of the UK government in 
Westminster (Kintrea 2006).  Since the first elections in 1999 the Scottish Executive 
has been formed from a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition.  This has resulted in a 
continuity of policy priorities of which housing has been placed high on the agenda 
(Kintrea 2006).  Stock transfer or ‘community ownership’ as the Scottish Executive 
prefers to call it, has subsequently been presented as a vehicle to deliver a plethora of 
high-level government objectives including social justice, social cohesion and 
community empowerment (Kintrea 2006; Scottish Executive 2004).
In its present form community ownership is the label applied to the Scottish 
Executive’s national programme of predominantly whole stock transfers of local 
authority housing.  This is not a novel agenda but one which has a long legacy in 
Scotland, particularly in Glasgow where community ownership was first pioneered by 
the City Council in the mid 1980s as a bottom up response to regenerate small pockets 
of council housing (Clapham et al 1991, 1996).  The success of this policy saw it 
rolled out nationally and by 1997 there were 119 small-scale, partial transfers from 
local authorities involving over 18,000 units of housing (Taylor 2004: 127).  There 
were few housing associations in Scotland prior to the 1970s (Scott 1997).  These 
partial stock transfers were therefore a key factor in the expansion of the sector and 
have encouraged the emergence of a housing association movement that is dominated 
by small-scale, locally based, tenant controlled organisations (Communities Scotland 
2006).  
7Yet financial considerations are also an important driver for change.  The three 
whole stock transfers that took place in Scotland in 2003 resulted in excess of £1 
billion pounds of overhanging debt being written off by the UK Treasury - £2.3 
billion pounds of debt however remained (Scottish Executive 2004: 6).  As options for 
investing in council housing are more limited in Scotland than in England, whole 
stock transfer has emerged as the main vehicle by which local authorities can fulfil
their obligations to modernise council housing (Mooney and Poole 2005).  
What unites both traditions of community ownership is a desire to secure 
significant additional housing investment whilst also facilitating tenant empowerment.  
The Scottish Executive’s present commitment to local control and ownership is 
therefore heavily indebted to past policy successes - small scale, partial stock 
transfers, and the model of housing management and ownership that emerged from 
this: that of the community based housing associations (Kintrea 2006; McKee 2006).  
Given the differences in scale between past and present models of community 
ownership (see for example, Taylor 2004), it remains to be seen whether a governance 
model designed for a locally based, small scale organisation can be successfully 
transferred on to a large-scale stock transfer association.  Yet as research on the 
original community ownership transfers highlights, what is important to tenants is not 
primarily who owns the housing, but their ability to exert influence and control 
(Clapham et al 1991).
4. The Research 
The research reported here reflects the initial findings from ongoing doctoral research 
the fieldwork of which was undertaken in Glasgow between August 2005 – April 
2006.  The research design involved two key stages: ethnographic case study research 
8involving three community housing organisations, complemented by an external 
phase involving key-actor interviews, documentary analysis, and non-participant 
observation.  
The case studies include two LHOs involved in the pilot SST programme, and, 
as a comparator, an established housing association based in the city which operates 
outwith the GHA context.  Attention was given to attempt to select organisations of a 
broadly similar size and based in different parts of the city.  Efforts were also made to 
incorporate the different types of LHO: these are Forum LHOs, which are newly 
created organisations that have emerged post-transfer from the City Council’s tenant 
participation strategy, and CBHA LHOs which are existing housing associations that 
have become involved in managing GHA stock.
A range of qualitative methods were employed in this study across both the 
case study and external phases.  First, a wide range of documentary material was 
examined, for example local constitutional documents, tenant satisfaction surveys and 
key pre-transfer documents.  Second, at least five management committee meetings 
were observed in each of the case studies; additional events were observed during 
both the case study and external phases where available and appropriate.  Third, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with four groups of individuals: 19 members of 
local housing staff, 15 local resident committee members, and at the citywide/national 
level 10 housing practitioners and 10 housing policy-makers from the wider housing 
and political community, including the Scottish Executive, Glasgow Housing 
Association and Glasgow City Council.  Finally, 5 focus groups were held with 
tenants not involved in local management committees, involving 36 individuals in 
total.  As this paper only presents a small proportion of the overall findings of the
9study not all of the data sources or case studies are drawn on here: in particular the 
comparator case study and the tenant focus groups are not featured.
Due to the tensions that exist between Glasgow’s housing agencies post-
transfer particular attention was accorded to issues of confidentiality and anonymity.  
For this reason the names of some organisations have been removed where lean staff 
structures make individuals particularly identifiable.  Where direct quotes are used the 
interviewer’s comments appear in italics.  Given the ethnographic nature of the 
research and commitment to reflecting the multiple voices of local actors, efforts have 
also been made to preserve speakers’ original dialect.
5. The Glasgow Housing Association: more influence and control for tenants? 
The Pre-Transfer Council Days
Pre-transfer Glasgow City Council had a clear commitment to tenant involvement: it 
had a well-resourced tenant participation team, which was involved in promoting a 
range of initiatives from local-level involvement structures such as neighbourhood 
forums and estate action groups, to more strategic attempts to promote the housing co-
operative movement via both partial stock transfers and devolved management of the 
housing. Housing issues further comprised a significant part of elected members’
workloads, especially for those councillors representing areas with a lot of social 
housing.   
Despite recognition of the numerous initiatives the City Council were engaged 
in, key actors nonetheless described their experience of pre-transfer tenant 
participation in largely negative terms.  Firstly, tenant involvement was very 
frustrating for residents as it took the form of a “wish list” mentality where tenants 
were paid “lip service” to as there were no resources, and perhaps commitment, to 
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implement their locally identified priorities.  This resulted in activists becoming very 
disillusioned with the process as they were constantly raising the same issues over and 
over yet they were never attended too.
“… [a housing officer] came to our (estate action group) meetings all the time 
and she took notes and I used to say to her ‘don’t bother taking any more of 
these notes if you’re no going to do anything about it’.  Because the next 
month it was the same I says ‘it’s just a repeat, you should copy the last 
meeting’ (laughs).  Shame, but it was really getting us down; it was 
ridiculous” (LHO Committee Member).
This view was echoed by local housing staff who were only too aware of the 
limitations of the Council’s approach to tenant participation.  They described local 
structures as simply “talking shops” where residents could come and have a “moan” 
and raise their complaints but where nothing would really happen because resource 
constraints prevented them from implementing tenants’ priorities.  This ultimately 
limited the potential of participation structures and undermined the whole process.  
Secondly, decision making was perceived to be centralised and taken by 
individuals out with the local area, with the sheer size of the Council as an 
organisation acting as a “shield” for bureaucratic and remote decisions by both 
officers and councillors, which local staff then had to implement.  There was no room 
for meaningful tenant involvement in this top-down model of decision making, and 
both committee members and local housing staff reflected on the “take it or leave it” 
attitude that was prevalent in the City Council at this time.
“How were decisions taken then about local issues?  They were taken from 
the centre by people who didn’t live in the area… As I say we always had a 
wish list and it was taken into the centre and somebody says ‘no they’re no 
getting it’ or maybe, and this is maybe me being a bit cynical, if it was an 
election year and somebody, the Labour candidate or whoever it was in a 
shaky seat it was ‘Oh we’ll pour some money in there then; that’ll make it 
look good so we can save his seat’” (LHO Committee Member, Office Bearer).
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Thirdly, the small number of issues that tenants did have influence over were 
perceived as minor, such as ‘no ball playing’ signs, dog fouling, or graffiti.  Council 
staff defended this position by reference to the difficult financial environment.  Yet a 
small number of tenants who were active at this time commented that even the minor 
issues they were raising about the general environment of the local area, which 
required minimal resourcing, were still ignored.  As one committee member observed, 
you cannot resource tenant involvement out of “a big box of nothing”: tenant 
priorities need to be funded and delivered upon in order to sustain their interest and 
motivation.  Given the Council’s failure to meet these expectations, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that activists became jaded with the whole process and the majority of 
staff regarded it as an unwelcome burden in an already difficult job.
Fragmentation, localism and devolved control
Compared to the pre-transfer situation the structures of tenant involvement in 
Glasgow have been transformed.  As has already been discussed, 60 LHOs have been 
established across the city: these are existing or new, independent registered social 
landlords.  These community organisations are small-scale, locally based and 
governed by a management committee comprised of a majority of local tenants.  
Stock transfer has therefore resulted not only in the significant growth of the city’s 
community housing movement but also the number of active committee members 
(circa 600-700 LHO committee members).
In order to deliver a devolved management structure, these local committees 
have entered into a contractual management agreement2 to provide services for the 
GHA.  As table 1 indicates overleaf, the management agreement outlines the 
functional division of responsibilities between the centre (the GHA central team) and 
12
the periphery (the LHO network).  It is in effect a two-way service contract with the 
performance of both parties measured against their ability to meet key performance 
indicators.  The ability of the LHOs to deliver these standards is however dependent 
on centrally provided services.  For example, local arrears management may be 
effected by centrally provided computer systems failings, or delays in the centrally 
based legal team processing requests for court action.  The management agreement 
therefore binds both the GHA and their LHO partners into a mutually dependent 
relationship: they cannot achieve their respective goals in isolation without joint 
working.  Annual management allowances are paid to the LHOs based on the number 
of housing units managed, staffing and costs incurred in providing the service.  Most 
LHO staff are employed directly by the GHA, albeit managed locally, and whilst 
budgets such as maintenance and repairs are devolved the GHA’s central team 
physically makes all payments and therefore has ultimate control of financial 
resources.
[insert table]
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Table 1: Functional division of responsibilities between the GHA/LHO network
Source: adapted from GHA/LHO (2003) ‘Interim Management Agreement’ 
FUNCTIONAL 
AREA
GHA FUNCTIONS LHO FUNCTIONS
Allocations Guidance on GHA’s allocation 
policy, which must meet 
regulator’s monitoring & 
inspection requirements; allow 
LHOs access to citywide 
Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) system; 
strategic issues such as facilitating 
nominations between LHOs & 
specialist agencies.
Scope for policy to be varied 
locally; operational control of 
allocations (e.g. maintain housing 
list, allocate properties & general 
tenancy management); agree 
nominations with specialist 
agencies.
Day to day 
repairs
Procure & fund contracts 
centrally; develop targets and 
other monitoring requirements for 
third party contracts; establish 
LHO expenditure categories/ 
budgets; pay for all approved 
expenditure.
Agree budgets & monitoring 
criteria for third party contracts; 
monitor third party contracts; 
identify local repair priorities; 
instruct client-side post 
inspections; authorise payments to 
contractors.
Major repairs Supply LHOs with stock 
information; establish LHO 
budgets; award external contracts 
& process all payments; create 
strategic monitoring group.
Consult tenants on major works; 
develop local management & 
investment plan; liaise on stock 
condition information; contract, 
quality & financial monitoring.
Corporate &  
citywide 
services 
Provide full ICT system to the 
LHOs; provide Human Resources 
(HR) policies & procedures; 
control all payroll issues; oversee 
delivery of legal advice & attend 
court if necessary.
Ensure all staff properly trained in 
ICT & advise GHA on users; must 
apply GHA HR policies but 
responsible for their local 
implementation; can instruct legal 
action.
Arrears 
Management
Guidance on GHA’s arrears policy 
which must meet regulator’s 
monitoring & inspection 
requirements; provide LHOs with 
access to rent arrears system; take 
legal action against tenants.
Scope for policy to be varied 
locally; management of local rent 
& service charge arrears (e.g. 
arrears administration, home visits, 
assisting with Housing Benefit 
applications); instruct legal 
action/attend evictions; pursuit of 
former tenant arrears.
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Yet this contract provides the LHOs with enforceable legal rights, which in 
practice offers increased opportunities for local control as compared to the pre-
transfer situation.  Firstly, the post-transfer framework affords tenants an input into 
setting local policy variations.  Although they have to retain core elements and work 
within the established Scottish housing legislative and regulatory framework there is 
some leeway for debate and an ability to tailor policies to suit local circumstances.  
Whilst many LHOs have adopted to retain the standard version because of the 
workload involved and issues of comprehension amongst tenant members, on some 
issues, such as tenant participation and equal opportunities, a diversity of approaches 
have emerged.
Secondly, via the production of Local Management and Investment Plans 
stock transfer has allowed tenants to become involved in the setting of local 
investment priorities.  This involves identifying what work needs done most urgently 
and where projects should start, and also enables local people to be involved in 
choosing colours and designs for external or communal fabric works.  This has been a 
particularly welcome addition for committee members given the lack of investment 
and centralised decision making that occurred under the City Council, and many have 
taken considerable pride and enjoyment in planning future investment for their local 
area.
“What aspects of being on the committee do you enjoy?  The fact we can say 
no we’re no having that, we’ve now got some say in what we can do.  In the 
past, in the past when we went to the [Council] it was a case of this is the 
budget; this is what we’ve planned.  And it didn’t matter if you say ‘oh no I 
think that should have been done’ that was it.  So just now we can sit and talk 
and say, the likes of this week, tomorrow we’re coming in and we will pick 
the colours of the houses.  Things you never got involved in before” (LHO 
Committee Member).
15
Thirdly, the provision of performance monitoring information is a new 
experience for many tenant activists.  The LHO lead officer is ultimately line 
managed by their relevant local management committee and these statistics are 
therefore vital in ensuring desired targets are being met and staff accountability 
achieved.  This shift in relationship between staff and tenants has however been a 
difficult transition post-transfer, although partnerships are beginning to be forged and 
clarity about roles and responsibilities is slowly emerging.  
“…it’s a new set up that people are and people have been used to quite a 
different relationship with the staff beforehand.  So whereas you know people 
were tenants of the council and got told stuff by the staff the roles are in some 
ways kind of reversed, in that certainly in that some of the tenants locally who 
could occasionally be a thorn in the staff’s side are suddenly on the committee.  
So it’s a slightly different dynamic for people to get used to” (Policy Officer, 
Scottish Federation of Housing Associations).
Centralisation, internal conflict and organisational tensions
Despite these advancements in tenant control, for some key actors stock transfer has 
clearly fallen short of their expectations and aspirations.  The lack of ownership of 
assets is a key source of frustration for the LHOs who feel constrained within the 
devolved, and in their view, subservient relationship they have with the GHA.  The 
management agreement is a key source of tension here, because for the LHOs the 
functional responsibilities retained at the centre are perceived as the lifeblood of 
community ownership - centralised control by the GHA is therefore a recurring theme 
in discussions with LHO actors.  
Firstly, centrally set and controlled budgets act as a cap on both local 
investment aspirations and the local management service, as both staff and committee 
members have to operate and make decisions within the budget they are allocated.  
Furthermore even when decisions are made within the allocated budget headings 
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these local plans still have to be ratified by the centre in a rather bureaucratic fashion, 
leading to accusations by LHO actors that the GHA is “just the council with another 
name”.  This centralised payment and procurement approach has further resulted in a 
“one size fits all” approach being implemented in the huge investment programme 
currently being rolled out across the city.  Whilst individual tenant choice is permitted 
in terms of colours and designs (e.g. kitchens and bathroom suites), in terms of the 
bigger picture local preferences with regards to the style and cost of the modernisation 
works are being sacrificed for bulk procurement and standardisation.
“… [the GHA] have still got a wee bit of the old Glasgow city council in 
them: one size fits all.  So they’re putting what it costs for one kitchen in the 
city that’s the price for every kitchen in the city and it doesn’t work.  So I 
mean if you’re kitchen costs two thousand pounds and I’ve got a kitchen 
double the size of yours, it’s still only two thousand pounds that’s getting 
spent on it.  Which is daft” (LHO Committee Member).
Yet it is not only with regards to investment and maintenance that this 
centralised approach is evident, but also local policy variations.  For example, the 
LHOs were critical of GHA centrally directed major policy reviews and regarded 
them as being in direct opposition with aspirations to disaggregate the organisation.  
An example of this includes the 2005 Sheltered Housing Review, which proposed to 
remove resident wardens, alter the warden’s responsibilities and introduce specialist 
management teams.  Whilst the GHA has to ensure policies are compliant with the 
wider legislative/regulatory framework and these policies may have been received 
favourably by some organisations, if they come into effect they may equally be 
imposed on some LHOs who criticised and resisted them.  
“… [GHA] still tell us what to do, I mean they are holding a review: a 
sheltered housing review.  Why?  I don’t understand why they are getting 
involved with a review of my sheltered housing complexes (and) how they are 
run when we are supposed to be going stand-alone…I thought GHA was there 
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to guide us on our path now they’re trying to kind of interfere if you like” 
(LHO Housing Officer, GHA).
It is perhaps no surprise then that the management agreement has resulted in 
tense local and central relations, and indeed growing mistrust and hostility.  However 
some stakeholders have been more willing than others to regard this as an inevitable 
and unavoidable part of the present organisational model as opposed to the fault of 
any one party.  This tension between key partners is an important issue that urgently 
needs addressing, as it is not only undermines the devolved management structure but
is also a major impediment in negotiations surrounding SST.  
6. The Pathway to Second Stage Transfer
The importance of ownership 
As no secondary stage transfers have as yet been achieved it is too early to establish 
the extent to which the objective of community ownership has been realised on the 
ground.  The aspirations of LHO actors are however clear: SST is regarded as the only 
means by which they can realise their ambitions for local autonomy, and thus resolve 
present organisational tensions between the centre (GHA) and the periphery (the 
LHOs), in which the latter feel they are dependent upon and answerable to their 
‘master’ at the centre.
“How will things change post-SST?  I think obviously you’ll be a stand-alone 
organisation; you are not dependent on GHA releasing this money, releasing 
that money.  And really it’s your local.  More kind of local control I guess?  
Aye.  At the end of the day that’s what the transfer was all about wasn’t it, it 
was about getting more local control for people in the area” (LHO Housing 
Officer, GHA).
For the Scottish Executive and the LHOs and their representative 
organisations, SST was perceived as the key means to deliver upon the promises of 
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tenant empowerment that were fundamental to the transfer framework.  Post-SST the 
LHOs will own as well as manage the stock, and will therefore adopt a more 
traditional landlord role.  Like other registered social landlords, they will have 
autonomy over important matters such as rent setting, asset management, budgets, 
staffing and external contracts.  Furthermore, unlike the present landlord, the GHA, an
LHO is a small organisation based within, and controlled by, the local community –
this allows autonomy to be devolved to people that actually live in the locality and 
greater weighting accorded to local needs and priorities.  By elevating the 
involvement of tenants in the management and ownership of their housing SST 
therefore offers the ability to deliver something different, and most importantly 
superior, to the standardised and centrally directed service presently being delivered 
by the GHA.  
“…what really get’s me annoyed (is) the GHA people saying (SST) ‘oh it’s 
just the same’.  Well it’s not just the same we think we can be doing 
something here, or we wouldn’t be doing it.  We think we can make a 
difference…I think it will offer a better, a more responsive local service” 
(Member of LHO Management Team).
As a mechanism to realise community ownership SST emphasises the social 
dimension of stock transfer for it highlights both the importance and advantages of 
local control, bottom up decision making, and active tenant participation.  Yet it is not 
only autonomy but responsibility that is being devolved here: in the post-SST 
environment, LHOs and their management committees will be judged on their 
performance and will have to stand and fall by their own decisions.  They alone will 
become accountable for the success and failings of the organisation and there will be 
no third party to blame.  This will be a new experience for committee members, who 
have already undergone a transition in their role from activist to becoming part of the 
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landlord organisation itself.  Post SST their responsibilities will increase further for 
the LHO will become the tenants’ landlord, employer of all local housing staff, and 
will have sole control over how any rent monies are to be spent in the area.
“It offers choice.  It offers control, which is really important…. (and) with all 
this control and choice comes responsibility.  It was dead easy years ago for 
committee members or community activists to say ‘ooh it was the council but 
no we’re great’ but then suddenly it will be us and I think we’ll need to learn 
to say ‘wait a minute the buck stops here’.  With all this choice comes an 
awful lot of responsibility” (LHO Committee Member).
Whilst external actors from the wider housing and political community 
sympathised with the LHOs’ frustrations, they were nonetheless more critical about a 
necessary link between empowerment and ownership of the housing.   Here a debate 
emerged between stakeholders who, like the LHOs, believe that ownership is at the 
very heart of empowerment and is central to the success of the community based 
housing association model, and on the otherhand those who argue that tenant control 
is more fundamental than who owns the housing.  These divisions are not easy to 
map; however in broad terms what has emerged is a division between on the one hand 
the LHOs, housing association representative organisations and Communities 
Scotland, and on the other the GHA, the City Council and tenant representative
organisations.
Of those who were sceptical of the necessity of ownership their argument 
adopted two main forms: firstly, that the initial transfer from the City Council has 
been successful in delivering enhanced tenant empowerment via the devolved 
management structure, and secondly that tenants may not necessarily aspire to 
become involved in the control of their housing and indeed may have more 
instrumental goals for the transfer process such as investment in the housing and 
stable rent levels.  This grouping also stressed the need for a rational debate about the 
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future provision of Glasgow’s social housing, and argued what was important was not 
organisational structure but the nature of tenant involvement and local control on 
offer.  The insinuation here is that because of ideological and financial drivers the 
Scottish Executive have become obsessed with recreating the success of the 
community based housing association model without fully considering alternative 
means of ‘empowering’ tenants.
“I don’t think that Community Ownership matters a jot, I think community 
empowerment, community control is what matters ownership means nothing.  
And in my experience of tenants, tenants don’t care who actually owns their 
house they care that they are properly involved in the decisions that go on 
around that house” (Senior Representative, Development and Regeneration 
Services, Glasgow City Council).
Therefore whilst all parties expressed a commitment to the empowerment of 
Glasgow’s tenants they nonetheless had different visions of what this empowerment 
involved and its fundamental properties.
Blame culture
SST has become a life project and top priority for those actively involved in the 
negotiation process.  It is very much a live issue, and at emotive one at that, for a lot 
of time and effort has been invested by all parties in trying to deliver on this most 
fundamental of goals.  As a result a blame culture has emerged in which key actors 
have become involved in venting their frustrations by blaming each other for the lack
of progress.  
The GHA is the organisation that has received the most criticism for the 
inability to realise aspirations for community ownership.  Indeed the organisation’s 
commitment to the process has been called into question as both the LHOs and their 
representative organisations have accused the GHA of blocking the process and 
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manipulating the situation in order to maintain the status quo.  The insinuation here is 
that the GHA is not committed to the principles of community ownership, and instead 
wishes to retain long term control and ownership of the housing stock for itself.  
“…the GHA I think are now manipulating the situation because they have 
never been committed to a structure that was set up before they were in being.  
Because you’ve got to remember the framework document was set up by the 
(Scottish) Executive and the City Council.  Now the GHA had to adopt part of 
that framework to take it to tenants, and they were committed to it because it 
was statutory notices and it was contained in a transfer proposal that GHA 
built up.  (But) I don’t think they own, or they didn’t work through, or they 
didn’t fully understand the public policy framework they’re being asked to 
operate within” (Former Civil Servant, Scottish Homes).
Whilst the GHA acknowledged these criticisms, senior representatives interviewed 
dismissed suggestions that they were deliberately undermining the process, and that it 
was in fact the sheer practicalities of facilitating SST that was slowing things down.  
Whilst there is not scope within this paper to explore these practical barriers it is 
important to note that the major hurdle in realising ambitions for community 
ownership has been the financial cost of SST; negotiations have therefore centred on 
arriving at a price that is mutually agreeable to both potential purchasers (the LHOs) 
and the seller (the GHA) (for further discussion, see McKee 2006).
Yet the GHA is not the only party that has come under criticism.  Firstly, the 
LHOs (the CBHA LHOs in particular) have been criticised for what has been 
perceived as the selfish pursuit of SST at any cost, including to the detriment of GHA 
tenants in other LHOs who do not proceed to SST immediately.  Here critics, 
particularly from within the GHA and the City Council, have accused them of seeking 
a “sweetheart deal” by having the conditions for a successful SST altered to suit them 
and also for their reluctance to bring their own financial reserves to the table in order 
to plug the “expectation gap” over the price and fundability of SST.  The CBHA 
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LHOs have however dismissed such accusations and counter argued, not only would 
it be inappropriate to jeopardise the level of service they can provide to their existing 
tenants by using their own resources to acquire GHA stock, but that they do not have 
the necessary financial reserves in order to render SST fundable.
Secondly, the Scottish Executive and its housing agency Communities 
Scotland have not escaped criticism either.  Community ownership is ultimately a 
policy that comes with a price tag attached, and the continued slow progress of SST 
has heaped further political pressure on the Executive to intervene and provide 
additional financial resources; this is a particularly compelling argument given the 
close involvement of Communities Scotland in the initial transfer from the City 
Council, and therefore future plans for SST.
“…the Executive are saying on the one hand ‘we wants this’ but on the other 
hand when you say that’s the price of it they say ‘no I want it but I don’t want 
to pay that for it so get me it’.  Well you can’t get a Rolls Royce unless you’ve 
got the cash, you might have to settle for a mini” (Senior Representative, 
Development and Regeneration Services, Glasgow City Council).
The Executive have however defended their position by citing the investment 
Glasgow has already received to modernise its housing, and that it is ultimately the 
GHA’s responsibility as landlord to deliver its promises within the budget agreed at 
the outset.  
“We made the commitment: you know there was a business plan there.  Now 
(as) I understand it the GHA have changed the business plan, that’s quite 
within their remit to do that, again I would not be entrenched about that… 
(but) the fact that you’ve changed a, b, c, and d means you might not have the 
same amount of money available for Second Stage Transfer is your 
responsibility; go and sort it…. you need to deliver what you promised” 
(Glasgow, Labour Member of the Scottish Parliament).
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Given the acute tensions between all the key actors engaged in the process, 
perhaps all involved need to re-evaluate not only their own commitment to the 
process, but also the quality of their relations with supposed partners.  SST is a 
coveted prize that will only be reached through partnership and compromise.
7. Conclusion
The Glasgow housing stock transfer has resulted in positive change within the realm 
of housing governance: local residents through their LHO do have increased 
opportunities to get involved in the decision making process, and there is scope for 
them to shape the local housing management service to better reflect local needs.  For 
example, they are able to adapt centrally set policies, prioritise how local budgets are 
to be spent, and have a say on plans for local housing investment.  Whilst this 
represents some increase in power as compared to the pre-transfer Council days when 
decision making was very bureaucratic, centralised and tenant involvement was 
constrained by limited financial resources, it nonetheless fails to realise the ambitions 
of the plethora of local actors who became actively engaged in the process on the 
premise that it would deliver full community ownership.  
The paradox that emerges here then is that whilst the political ideal of 
community ownership embodies a productive form of power which seeks to mobilise 
active, responsible citizenship the reality of the implementation process has been a 
stark contrast.  The devolved management structure represents a classic centre-
periphery divide, and tense central-local relations have been exacerbated by 
frustration and disappointment over the slow progress in realising aspirations for local 
ownership of the housing.  It would seem then, that the only solution to resolve this 
fundamental tension is to facilitate SST; this is the only way critics will be convinced 
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of the GHA’s commitment to the process, and for the debate about whether ownership 
and empowerment are necessarily synonymous to be resolved.  
Yet the tensions surrounding the delivery of community ownership have wider 
implications than for the city of Glasgow alone.  Firstly, the increasing prevalence of 
governmental strategies that advocate devolving autonomy and control to local 
communities does not imply they will necessarily be effective in realising their 
desired outcomes (see for example, Cruikshank 1994; 1999).  Conflict and tensions 
are simultaneously part of the dynamic of this productive form of power, for the 
‘governed’ are fundamentally autonomous actors capable of thinking and acting 
otherwise; indeed, if power was so pervasive in society that it resulted in a seamless 
web of control then governmental strategies would not be necessary in the first 
instance (Foucault 2003b).  Secondly, whilst ‘empowering’ citizens may have the 
effect of maximising citizen control, its prime function is the shaping of individuals’
towards desired ends.  Constituting individuals as active citizens is above all a 
governmental technique aimed at governing from a distance in an era in which the 
state no longer has the monopoly on solving all of society’s problems (Rose 1999).  
Finally, despite the political rhetoric infused in notions of community empowerment, 
of which the Glasgow transfer is a prime example, it remains to be seen whether 
transforming governance alone can offer a sustainable solution to tackling social-
political problems (Rose 2001).  Whilst devolved governance clearly has liberatory 
potential, it also represents a means by which government can absolve itself of blame 
by making local communities responsible for their own destiny, for it is not only 
autonomy which is being devolved but ultimately responsibility.
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Notes
1 Stock transfer involves the sale of housing out of the public sector (i.e. local 
authority or Scottish Homes) into the private/voluntary sector (i.e. housing association 
or housing co-operative).  For a fuller discussion of the definitions and different types 
of stock transfer in Scotland and their differences with the rest of the UK, see Gibb 
(2003) or Taylor (2004).
2 The management agreement refers to the interim management agreement (IMA) 
signed by the LHOs/GHA immediately after the stock transfer from the City Council 
in 2003.  Just after fieldwork ended, the IMA was slightly revised to take into account 
the implications of EU procurement legislation.  It is now referred to as the 
Remodelled Management Agreement (RMA) within the GHA.
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